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Abstract 
 
Providing health insurance involves a trade-off between the benefits from risk spreading 
and the costs due to moral hazard. Focusing on pharmaceuticals consumption, this paper 
examines theoretically whether reference pricing, requiring individuals to pay the price 
difference if, in this case, they don’t buy the cheaper parallel imported drug, can ease this 
trade-off – an issue which has not previously been pointed out in the debate on health 
insurance. The results indicate that, if individuals are extremely risk-averse, a policy shift 
from coinsurance to reference pricing would do this by providing more insurance while 
decreasing moral hazard.  
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Introduction 
 
Individuals cannot predict whether they will have a serious illness, or when; or whether it 
will disappear or recur, and how much medical treatment will cost. This inherent 
unpredictability of medical consumption is the reason for health insurance. However, if 
individuals were fully insured, they would over-consume, use more or prefer more costly, 
medical care, which raises moral hazard issues. For example, fully insured individuals 
would visit physicians more often, or would prefer more expensive brand-name drugs to 
cheaper alternatives: to generics, in the case of off-patent drugs, and to parallel imports in 
the case of on-patent drugs. Not only would individuals over consume (demand-side 
moral hazard), but healthcare providers and pharmaceutical producers would also 
overcharge (supply-side moral hazard), as a result of the distortion in price sensitivity 
caused by insurance.1 Thus, insurers must trade off the benefits from more generous 
insurance - primarily the reduction in risk it affords – against the costs of more generous 
insurance - primarily moral hazard (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1999).    
 
Experimental studies conducted in various parts of the world (Namibia: Asfaw et al., 
2008; Wuhan, China: Liu et al., 2007) found that individuals were willing to pay 5%-
11% of their income for health insurance. Thus, on the one hand, individuals attach high 
value to health insurance. But, on the other hand, as the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment (HIE) demonstrated, in the presence of generous health insurance they over-
consume healthcare, resulting in welfare loss. 2 Per capita expenses on the free plan (no 
out-of-pocket costs) were 45% higher than those for the least generous cost-sharing plan, 
where individuals paid 95% of the costs (Manning et al., 1987). Based on HIE data, 
Manning and Marquis (1989) estimated that, when individuals paid only 1% instead of 
paying the full cost, moral hazard losses were more than twice the gains from risk-
avoided (US$1596 vs. US$706 per family in 1988 dollars). More recently, Feldstein and 
Gruber (1994) estimated a potential $34 billion per year increase in aggregate welfare 
from switching to a modest health insurance. 
                                                 
1 Feldstein (1973) shows that more insurance increases the price of care.  
2 The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, initiated in 1974 and completed in 1982, has been the only  
long-term experimental study of cost-sharing and its effect on service use, quality of care, and health.   
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Demand response to insurance-induced change in out-of-pocket cost has also been 
estimated focusing specifically on pharmaceuticals consumption. Insurance provides 
incentives for individuals to consume both more (Coulson and Stuart, 1995; Coulson et 
al., 1995; Rudholm, 2005; Costa-Font et al., 2007), and more expensive (Lundin, 2000), 
prescription pharmaceuticals. Lundin (2000) showed that patients getting most of their 
costs reimbursed were more likely to have more expensive brand-name drugs prescribed 
than patients paying a larger share of the cost.   
 
Insurance has also been found to create moral hazard on the supply side: Pharmaceutical 
prices change significantly as a response to a change in health insurance (Pavcnik, 2002). 
When the cost is shared by the insurer, both individuals and physicians are less price-
sensitive than they would otherwise be. As a result, demand is less price-elastic, and 
pharmaceutical producers naturally charge higher prices.  
 
As evidenced, providing optimal health insurance involves a trade-off between the 
benefit from risk reduction and the cost of deleterious incentives. Thus, it is extremely 
important to find ways to ease this trade-off, “a happy compromise with some risk-
spreading and some incentive” (Zeckhauser, 1970:10) for individuals to be cost-
conscious in the purchase of healthcare. This paper demonstrates that reference pricing, a 
consumer-driven healthcare reimbursement policy, can provide just that – something that 
has not previously been pointed out in the debate. 
 
To correct for the distortion in price-sensitivity caused by insurance and make individuals 
more price-sensitive, reference pricing has been introduced in many countries: Germany, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Poland, and Slovenia in Europe; 
also Canada (British Colombia), New Zealand, and Australia (Lopez-Casasnovas and 
Puig-Junoy (2000) review the variations in their practices). The common feature of these 
cost-containment policies is that pharmaceuticals are classified into groups with similar 
active ingredients or indications and a reference price is set for each group. If the price of 
a consumer-chosen product is higher than the reference price, then the consumer pays the 
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price difference, so that they are more exposed to the “real” cost, reducing moral hazard.  
It has been shown empirically that such reference pricing increases consumer price-
sensitivity and competition (Aronsson, Bergman and Rudholm, 2001; Pavcnik, 2002; 
Bergman and Rudholm, 2003; Brekke et al., 2008). It has also been shown theoretically 
that, under reference pricing, parallel trade of pharmaceuticals increases competition and 
decreases price more in the importing country than under coinsurance, where a flat 
percentage of the cost is paid by the consumer and the rest is paid by the insurer (Köksal, 
2009). Although there are empirical and theoretical studies supporting policy change 
from coinsurance to reference pricing, the implications of reference pricing for the trade-
off between risk pooling and moral hazard haven’t previously been discussed in the 
literature. Focusing specifically on pharmaceuticals consumption, this paper primarily 
attempts to fill this gap by examining theoretically whether reference pricing provides 
more insurance, while decreasing moral hazard.  
 
A two country model of price differentiation is developed where a manufacturer produces 
a patented drug treating a certain disease, and supplies both countries. The two countries 
differ in terms of individuals’ valuations of the drug and in terms of the coinsurance rate, 
the percentage of the price consumer pays. Hence the manufacturer price differentiates 
between the two countries. Parallel trade is legal, so that parallel traders can buy the drug 
in the low-price (exporting, foreign) country and resell it in the high-price (importing, 
home) country. As a result, the drug is both locally sourced in the high-price country, 
directly from the manufacturer, and parallel imported from the low-price country.  
 
Each individual faces the risk of getting sick with a certain probability. There are two 
types of individuals, high type (H-type), and low type (L-type) in the home country. 
Depending on their type, individuals have higher or lower severity of the disease. Sick 
individuals choose either the parallel imported or the locally sourced drug, given their 
prices and the coinsurance rate (the percentage of price paid out-of-pocket).  
 
Although the two drugs are therapeutically equivalent, some might perceive the parallel 
import as inferior, since it is repackaged or relabeled by parallel traders. Differences in 
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labeling might cause individuals to get confused and question the quality, safety and 
efficacy of the parallel imports. Apart from differences in packaging and labeling, 
differences in price might also affect individuals’ quality expectations which in turn 
might influence therapeutic efficacy.3 Waber et al. (2008) have clinically demonstrated 
this so called placebo response to lower prices.4 Thus it is assumed in the model that both 
types value the locally sourced drug more than the parallel import, but H-types value both 
treatments more than do L-types.  
 
The model is solved as a three stage game under two alternative healthcare 
reimbursement policies (i) coinsurance, and (ii) reference pricing. Although, reference 
pricing is structured differently from country to country, it is assumed that drugs 
therapeutically equivalent -with the same active substance in the same dosage form- are 
clustered together, and reference price is set equal to the price of the cheapest drug in the 
cluster. The timing of the game is as follows. First, the home-country government sets 
socially optimal coinsurance rate. Second, the manufacturer sets profit maximizing prices 
in the home and foreign countries. Third, individuals in the home-country choose which 
drug to consume, locally sourced or parallel import.  
 
The results show that individuals are not fully insured under either policy. Under 
coinsurance, they pay a percentage of the cost and the rest is paid by the insurance. 
However, under reference pricing individuals are subsidized by an amount equal to a 
percentage of the price of the parallel imported drug regardless of their choice, and those 
who consume locally sourced drug in the optimum pay the price difference out of their 
pocket. The comparative risk analysis indicates that individuals are provided more 
insurance under reference pricing than they are under coinsurance. As a result, when 
individuals are extremely risk averse, reference pricing both corrects for the moral hazard 
problem and provides more insurance.   
                                                 
3 Pharmaceuticals are credence goods about which individuals have no information. Lacking knowledge of       
a product, they tend to use price as an indicator of quality, that more expensive must be better. 
4 Waber et al. (2008) argue that “placebo responses” to commercial features may help explain why patients  
switching from branded medications may report that their generic equivalents are less effective. With 
reference to Waber et al. (2008), Sapone et al. (2009) claim that, paradoxically, the “conscious” choice of 
the generic drug, because of financial benefits, can “unconsciously” reduce its therapeutic efficacy. 
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The next section presents the model in detail and solves for optimal cost-sharing under 
coinsurance and under reference pricing. Then, the following section discusses the 
change in welfare caused by a policy shift from coinsurance to reference pricing. The 
section after that carries out a comparative risk analysis based on Rothschild and 
Stiglitz’s (1970) definition of increasing risk. Finally, the last section derives policy 
implications and conclusions.    
 
Model 
 
In a two country model of price differentiation, a manufacturer is assumed to produce a 
patented drug, treating a certain disease, and to supply both countries. The manufacturer 
price discriminates, since the countries are assumed to differ in their valuations of the 
drug and the coinsurance rate. Parallel trade is assumed to be legal, so that parallel traders 
can buy the drug in the low price country (exporting foreign country) and resell it in the 
high price (importing home) country. 
 
In the home country, there are two types of individuals, high type (H-type) with share   
of the population, and low type (L-type) with share 1 . Initially, both types are 
healthy, represented by a health stock of  , which gets impaired when, with probability 
q , they become sick. H-types, in comparison to L-types, are assumed to be affected 
more severely, and hence have a lower health stock when sick. Then they have a health 
stock of HS , while L-types have a health stock of LS , such that   LSHS . As 
treatment, sick individuals are assumed to choose either the locally sourced drug or, if 
available, the parallel imported drug. After treatment, an individual 'i s health status 
improves to ij  where LHi ,  denotes individual’s type and BAj , denotes the chosen 
drug, locally sourced or parallel imported.  
 
Parallel imports are therapeutically equivalent to locally sourced drugs, with no real 
difference between them. However, they differ in packaging, since parallel imports are 
repackaged or relabelled by parallel traders before being sold in the home country. 
Differences in packaging and labelling might create uncertainty among consumers about 
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the product’s quality, safety and efficacy, possibly causing them to perceive parallel 
imports as inferior. Such concerns make them question the drug side effects and 
responsiveness. Apart from differences in packaging and labeling, differences in price 
might also affect individuals’ quality-expectations, which can in turn influence 
therapeutic efficacy. Individuals might have placebo responses to lower prices, as 
clinically shown by Waber et al. (2008)5, and might consider the parallel imported drug 
of low efficacy and hence value parallel imported drug less. Thus, it is assumed that both 
types prefer the locally sourced drug, valuing it more than the parallel import, so that 
H
A
H
B    and LALB   . Moreover, since H-types are affected severely when sick, they 
value each treatment more than L-types do, implying that LB
H
B    and LAHA   . It is also 
assumed that H-types gain not only higher total utility but also higher marginal utility 
than do L-types from consuming a locally sourced drug (the single crossing property), 
resulting in the following condition: 
 
L
A
L
B
H
A
H
B    
 
Both types are assumed to be covered by insurance with individuals paying an actuarially 
fair premium of p , which satisfies the zero profit condition for the insurers, and sharing 
the cost of treatment when sick.6 Utility, then, depends on being healthy or sick; and, 
when sick, on whether treated by a locally sourced drug or a parallel imported drug. 
Individual 'i s state dependent utility is defined using the exponential utility function 
 
  rUV  exp  
 
where  rU  is ordinal utility and  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Larger 
values of   imply that individuals are more risk averse and thus willing to pay higher 
                                                 
5 Waber et al. (2008) show that the discounted low-price medication was less effective than the regular  
price one. 
6 The insurance market is assumed to be perfectly competitive where insurance companies earn zero 
expected profits and charge actuarially fair premiums. 
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premiums for more generous heath insurance. Given exogenous income y , cardinal 
utility is then 
 
    pyu exp when individual i  is healthy, 
  iSpyu   exp when individual i  is sick,  
and 
  ijjppyu   exp when individual i  is sick but treated by one of the drugs,  
where jp is the out-of-pocket cost of the chosen treatment, defined as a function of price 
jc subject to the reimbursement policy.  
 
Expected social utility is then 
           LjjHjj ppyppyqpyqEU   1expexp1
 
which is a function of the probability of becoming sick and the choice of treatment when 
sick. 
 
In the analysis, two alternative health care reimbursement policies (i) coinsurance, and 
(ii) reference pricing are considered. Under coinsurance, cost is shared, so that 
individuals pay a percentage  CIr  of the price, and public insurance pays the rest, 
 CIr1 . Under reference pricing, however, individuals pay only a percentage  RPr  of the 
price of the chosen drug if it is lower than the reference price, otherwise they pay the 
percentage of the reference price and the full price difference. 
 
Given preferences, prices of the drugs, and reimbursement regime, either both types 
consume the same drug, or each type consumes a different drug in the optimum. Thus 
four cases - two pooling and two separating - are possible under each regime, namely: 
AA where both types consume the parallel imported drug; BB  where both types consume 
the locally sourced drug; AB where H-types consume the locally sourced drug and L-
types consume the parallel imported drug; and BA  where H-types consume the parallel 
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imported drug and L-types consume the locally sourced drug. But BA could never be 
optimal, since, everything else equal, given the single crossing property, a higher social 
welfare could always be attained by simply swapping drugs between two individuals of 
different types. The other three cases could each be optimal under certain conditions, 
which are defined solving the model as a three stage game. In the first stage, the public 
insurer sets the socially optimal coinsurance rate given the reimbursement policy. Then, 
in the second stage, the monopolist sets profit maximizing prices in each country taking 
the coinsurance rate as given. In the last stage, individuals choose one of the drugs given 
prices and the reimbursement policy. The game is solved using backward induction under 
both coinsurance and reference pricing.  
 
If individuals were of one type, everyone would consume the same drug and everyone 
would be fully insured. A similar situation would arise if there were perfect information 
and individual types were known. However, since types are individuals’ private 
information, the monopolist and the government induce individuals to reveal their type 
by self-selecting the appropriate drug. Hence, in each case, individuals’ choices are 
determined by two constraints: the individual rationality constraint (IR), and the incentive 
compatibility constraint (self-selection constraints) (IC). First, each type, when sick, must 
want to consume a drug and be willing to pay the out of pocket cost  jp , so that they are 
at least as well off consuming the drug as not. Second, each type must prefer one drug to 
the other. Both types then consume parallel imports if  
 
A
H
S
H
A
H
A
A
L
S
L
A
L
A
pIR
pIR




:
:
              and          
AB
H
A
H
B
H
AB
L
A
L
B
L
ppIC
ppIC




:
:
 
 
or both consume the locally sourced drug if 
 
B
H
S
H
B
H
B
B
L
S
L
B
L
B
pIR
pIR




:
:
  and       
AB
H
A
H
B
H
AB
L
A
L
B
L
ppIC
ppIC




:
:
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But if 
 
 
B
H
S
H
B
H
B
A
L
S
L
A
L
A
pIR
pIR




:
:
  and       
AB
H
A
H
B
H
AB
L
A
L
B
L
ppIC
ppIC




:
:
 
 
then H-types consume the locally sourced drug while L-types consume the parallel 
import. 
 
Since out of pocket cost  jp  depends on the reimbursement policy, the model is solved 
first under coinsurance, and then, separately, under reference pricing.       
 
Coinsurance 
 
Under coinsurance, an individual pays a percentage  CIr  of the price  jc   of the chosen 
drug, and the rest is paid by public insurance. The out of pocket cost  jp , is then  
 
jCIj crp     where    BAj ,  
 
We solve the model starting from the third stage of the game, where individuals choose, 
given prices and coinsurance rate. Individuals of type i  will choose a parallel import if 
consuming it makes them better off than not consuming at all, and if they prefer it to the 
locally sourced drug, so that 
A
CI
i
S
i
Ai
A cr
IR :   and  AB
CI
i
A
i
Bi cc
r
IC :  
Similarly, individuals of type i  will choose the locally sourced drug if consuming it 
makes them better off than not consuming at all, and if they prefer it to the parallel 
import, so that  
B
CI
i
S
i
Bi
B cr
IR :   and  AB
CI
i
A
i
Bi cc
r
IC :  
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The constraints that shape individuals’ preferences are then 
 
A
CI
H
S
H
AH
A
A
CI
L
S
L
AL
A
c
r
IR
c
r
IR




:
:
       ,        
B
CI
H
S
H
BH
B
B
CI
L
S
L
BL
B
c
r
IR
c
r
IR




:
:
       and          
AB
CI
H
A
H
BH
AB
CI
L
A
L
BL
cc
r
IC
cc
r
IC




:
:
   
 
Let, for simplicity, ijV  denote the valuation of drug j  by an individual of type i , so that 
i
S
i
j
i
jV   . Redefined accordingly, the constraints are then illustrated in Figure 1 to 
show the conditions under which both types consume the same drug  BBAA, ; they 
consume different drugs  AB ; only H-types consume a drug  BA  , ; or neither 
consumes any drug   . 
   
 
 
Figure 1. Individual rationality constraints, incentive compatibility constraints, and    
feasible allocations under coinsurance  
Ac
 
H
AIR  
  
B
BB
AA
A  
AB  
L
AIR  
H
BIR
L
BIR
LIC  
Bc
CI
L
A
r
V
CI
H
A
r
V  
CI
H
B
r
V  
CI
L
B
r
V
45  
HIC
CI
H
A
CI
H
B
r
V
r
V   
CI
L
A
CI
L
B
r
V
r
V   
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Demand in the foreign country can be described by a negatively sloped demand function 
 
AcrvD
**   
 
where *v  denotes the highest willingness to pay for the drug there, and *r the rate of 
coinsurance. 
 
In Autarky, when parallel trade is forbidden by law, the equilibrium price in the foreign 
country is then 
*
*
2r
vcA      
and assuming both types consume a drug, the equilibrium price in the home country is 
CI
L
S
L
B
B r
c    
Suppose the two countries differ in such a way that the inequality
CI
L
S
L
B
rr
v  *
*
2
holds, 
i.e., that the foreign price is lower than the home price. Then price in the home country is 
larger than that in the foreign country. Given sufficient price difference, if parallel trade 
is allowed, parallel traders in a perfectly competitive market can buy the drug in the 
foreign country and re-sell it in the home country. It is assumed that the home country is 
a small open economy such that it has no influence on the world prices and hence price in 
the foreign country stays the same when parallel trade is allowed. 7   
                                                 
7 If both types were to consume parallel imports in the home country, the monopolist profit would be then 
  AcAcrvMAcM ***    
where M represents the size of the home country market, and *M that of the foreign country.  
The profit maximizing equilibrium price of the parallel import would then be 
*2
*
*2
1
r
v
rmA
c      where   
M
M
m
*
  is the relative market size. 
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Even if both types prefer the locally sourced drug in equilibrium (i.e., BB ), suppose some 
fraction epsilon    amount of individuals always consume the parallel import. Although, 
demand in the out-patient market, which the analysis basically concerned with, is 
infinitesimal, the inpatient market (hospitals) creates a larger demand for parallel imports. 
So, given price difference, parallel imports are always available in the home country. 
For the rest of the paper, we will assume that the inequality 
r
v
r
v LA*
*
2
 holds, so that the IR 
constraint for L-types is fulfilled and both types consume a drug in the equilibrium. In 
addition, given the condition for parallel trade to take place, BA cc  , the relevant region 
for analysis is above the 45 line and left of the LAIR  line in Figure 1, leaving three 
possibilities: ABAA, , or BB .  
 
In the second stage of the game, given individual preferences’, coinsurance rate and the 
price of the parallel import, the monopolist sets the profit maximizing price in the home 
country equal to  
*
*
2r
v
r
c
CI
L
A
L
B
B   in the case of BB , which yields a profit of 

  *
*
2r
v
r
M
CI
L
A
L
B
BB
  
or 
*
*
2r
v
r
c
CI
H
A
H
B
B    in the case of AB  which yields a profit of 


 


  *
*
2r
v
rr
M
CI
H
A
CI
H
B
AB
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
If the home market is small compared to the foreign market, so that the term *2
1
rm
is negligible, then the 
equilibrium price in the foreign country is the same as in Autarky,  
*2
*
r
v
Ac   
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The monopolist’s profit is 
*
*
2r
vMAA  in the case of AA  
AA  cannot be optimal, since monopolist’s profit in AA is less than in .AB  Comparison 
of the corresponding profits indicates that either BB  or AB  would be optimal depending 
on the share of H-types.  
 Lemma I: If the share of H-types,  , is small, such that H
A
H
B
L
A
L
B

 
0 , then the 
optimal price charged by the monopolist will be *
*
2r
v
rr
c
CI
L
A
CI
L
B
B    and BB will be 
chosen. However, if   is large, such that 1
 

H
A
H
B
L
A
L
B , then the optimal price charged 
by the monopolist will be higher, *
*
2r
v
r
c
CI
H
A
H
B
B   and AB will be chosen.  
 
Given individuals’ choices and optimal prices, in the first stage of the game, the home 
country government sets the optimal coinsurance rate that maximizes social welfare. 
Though a closed form solution cannot be derived for the coinsurance rate with either 
larger or smaller share of H-types, it is shown in Appendix A that, under a certain 
assumption, closed form solutions can be derived. If individuals are extremely risk 
averse, so that  , the government would set the optimal coinsurance rate to 
maximize the utility of the marginal individuals, L-types (the individuals with the lowest 
utility after treatment). As shown in Appendix A, this boils down to analytically 
assigning all the weight to the third term of the derivative of the welfare function, which 
can also be defined as a weighted average of the derivatives of utilities in various states. 
The results indicate that individuals will not be fully insured in equilibrium under 
coinsurance. They will pay a percentage of the price 0
1
*  A
L
A
L
B
cq
qr   in the case 
of BB, and 0
1
*  A
H
A
H
B
cq
qr   in the case of AB. Individuals pay a smaller share 
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in the case of BB, when H-types are fewer, than they do in the case of AB. Although both 
types consume the locally sourced drug in the case of BB, they are not fully insured. The 
reason is that the monopolist would then charge a higher price, since individuals would 
be less price elastic.  
 
Reference Pricing  
 
Suppose the home country government changes the reimbursement policy from 
coinsurance to reference pricing where the parallel import determines the reference price 
for the locally sourced drug. An individual pays only a percentage  RPr  of the price of 
parallel import, plus the full price difference if choosing the more expensive locally 
sourced drug. The out of pocket cost, then, is  
 
 

 chosenisdrugsourcedlocallyifcccr
chosenisimportparallelifcr
p
ABARP
ARP
j     
 
As in the previous section, the model is solved starting from the third stage of the game 
where individuals make their choices. Individual of type i  will choose the parallel import 
if consuming it makes them better off than not consuming, and if they prefer it to the 
locally sourced drug, so that 
ARP
i
S
i
A
i
A crIR :   and  BAiAiBi ccIC :  
Similarly, individuals of type i  will choose the locally sourced drug if consuming it 
makes them better off than not consuming, and if they prefer it to the parallel import, so 
that  
  BARPiSiBiB ccrIR  1:    and  BAiAiBi ccIC :  
The constrains that shape individuals’ preferences are then 
 
ARP
H
S
H
A
H
A
ARP
L
S
L
A
L
A
crIR
crIR




:
:
 ,  
 
  BARPHSHBHB
BARP
L
S
L
B
L
B
ccrIR
ccrIR


1:
1:


 and       
BA
H
A
H
B
H
BA
L
A
L
B
L
ccIC
ccIC




:
:
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As before let, for simplicity, ijV  denote the valuation of drug j  by an individual of type 
i , so that iS
i
j
i
jV   . Redefined accordingly, the constraints are then illustrated in 
Figure 2 to show the conditions under which both types consume the same drug 
 BBAA, ; they consume different drugs  AB ; only H-types consume a drug  BA  , ; 
or neither consumes any drug   . 
 
 
Figure 2. Individual rationality constraints, incentive compatibility constraints, and      
                feasible allocations under reference pricing 
 
 
The individual rationality constraints for consuming parallel imports  iAIR   remain the 
same under reference pricing. However, the individual rationality constraints for 
consuming the locally sourced drug  iBIR  change slope as indicated by the arrows, and 
become steeper while the incentive compatibility constraints shift upwards without any 
change in slope.  
 
Ac
 
H
AIR
  
B
BB
AA
A
AB  
L
AIR  
H
BIR
L
BIR
H
A
H
B VV   
HIC
LIC  
H
BV  
L
BV
Bc
L
A
L
B VV   
RP
L
A
r
V
RP
H
A
r
V  
45  
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Similar to the analysis under coinsurance, given the inequality 
r
v
r
v LA*
*
2
 and the 
condition for parallel trade to take place, BA cc  , the relevant region for analysis is above 
the 45 line and left of the LAIR  line in Figure 2, leaving three possibilities; ABAA, , and 
BB .  
 
In the second stage of the game, given the individuals’ preferences, the coinsurance rate 
and the price of the parallel import, the monopolist sets the profit maximizing price in the 
home country equal to 
*
*
2r
vc LA
L
BB    in the case of BB , which yields a profit of 

  *
*
2r
vM LA
L
BBB   
or 
*
*
2r
vc HA
H
BB    in the case of AB , which yields a profit of *
*
2r
vMAB   
The monopolist’s profit in the case of AA  is 
  

  *
*
2r
vM HA
H
BAA   
 Again, AA  cannot be optimal, since monopolist earns less in AA  than in .AB  
Comparison of monopolist’s profits indicates that either BB  or AB  would be optimal, 
depending again on the share of H-types.  
Lemma II: If the share of H-types,  , is small, such that H
A
H
B
L
A
L
B

 
0 , then the 
optimal price charged by the monopolist will be *
*
2r
vc LA
L
BB    and BB will be 
chosen. However, if   is large, 1
 

H
A
H
B
L
A
L
B , then the optimal price charged by the 
monopolist will be higher, *
*
2r
vc HA
H
BB    and AB  will be chosen.   
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The condition for optimal allocation in both cases ( BB  and AB ) is independent of the 
rate of coinsurance which means that the government’s choice of optimal cost sharing has 
no effect on the optimal allocation. 
 
The price charged by the monopolist under reference pricing is lower than under 
coinsurance, due to increased competition. Although one might expect the price under 
reference pricing to be higher than that under no-insurance (or self-insurance), as shown 
in Köksal (2009), the price under reference pricing, in the present model, happens to be 
the same as what would be charged then. This means that reference pricing corrects 
totally for the supply-side moral hazard induced by insurance.  
 
Given individuals’ preferences and optimal prices, in the first stage of the game, the 
home country government sets the optimal coinsurance rate that maximizes social 
welfare. Appendix B shows that, in both cases ( BB  and AB ) individuals, if extremely 
risk averse, will be subsidized by an amount equal to a percentage of the price of the 
parallel import, regardless of their choice. However, those who choose locally sourced 
drug will pay the price difference.  
 
Will Everyone be Better-off? 
 
An interesting question is whether everyone will be better off after a switch from 
coinsurance to reference pricing. The answer is not obvious, since both the premium and 
the out-of-pocket cost of the drug change (see Table 1). Both change since they are 
functions of the price and the coinsurance rate, both of which change as a result of the 
policy shift. When reference pricing is introduced, the price of the locally sourced drug 
falls due to increased competition. However, the change in the premium is not that clear-
cut, since both the price and the coinsurance rate have changed. But we can compare total 
cost (out-of-pocket cost plus the premium paid) under coinsurance with that under 
reference pricing for both types. The comparisons (in Appendix C) indicate that, in both 
cases if the probability of getting sick is small, then all sick individuals will be better off 
under reference pricing. Assuming that there is no cash payment under reference pricing, 
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i.e., that the optimal coinsurance rate is zero, healthy people will also be better off. As a 
result, given that individuals get sick with a small probability, a policy shift from 
coinsurance to reference pricing would make all individuals better off.  
 
Table 1.  Costs of and benefits from various allocations for H-types and L-types under  
    coinsurance and reference pricing  
   Cost Benefit 
Coinsurance 
BB 
L-Type BCICI crp   LB  
H-Type BCICI crp   HB  
AB 
L-Type 
ACICI crp
''   LA  
H-Type '''
BCICI crp   HB  
Reference 
Pricing 
BB 
L-Type  ABARPRP cccrp   LB  
H-Type  ABARPRP cccrp   HB  
AB 
L-Type 
ARPRP crp
''   LA  
H-Type  ABARPRP cccrp  '''  HB  
 
 
“More Insurance” under Reference Pricing 
 
The analyses under coinsurance and reference pricing have shown that (i) individuals will 
not be fully insured under either policy; (ii) under coinsurance, they pay a percentage of 
the price of the chosen drug; (iii) under reference pricing, they are paid cash back equal 
to a percentage of the price of the parallel imported drug regardless of choice but asked to 
pay the price difference out-of-their pocket if they choose to consume locally sourced 
drug. Since the cost-sharing rule and the price of the locally sourced drug have both 
changed because of the policy shift, the out-of-pocket cost may differ under the two 
policies. But whether the policy shift will provide more or less insurance is still an open 
question.   
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Health insurance helps individuals avoid risk of financial loss in case of illness. More 
insurance lets individuals enjoy greater risk-avoidance. A natural measure of change in 
insurance provided thus depends on the change in risk avoided. If insurance pays more of 
the cost, individuals face less risk of financial loss. The share of cost paid by insurance 
can thus be used as a measure of riskiness. The analysis indicates that, in both cases ( BB  
and AB ) the share of cost paid by insurance is larger under reference pricing than it is 
under coinsurance.  
 
Proposition I. If individuals are extremely risk averse, then a policy shift from 
coinsurance to reference pricing will correct for moral hazard and provide individuals 
with more insurance. 
 
Proof. In the case of BB, the share of cost paid by insurance is  
B
BCI
cq
crq 1 under 
coinsurance, and  
B
ARP
cq
crq 1 under reference pricing. In the case of AB, it is 
     
  AB
ACIBCI
ccq
crcrq




1
111 under coinsurance, and    AB
ARP
ccq
crq
 

1
1 under 
reference pricing.  
 
Given optimal cost sharing under the assumption of extreme risk aversion (  ), the 
share of cost paid by the insurer is larger under reference pricing than under coinsurance 
in the case of BB since 
A
L
A
L
B
B
A
L
A
L
B
ccq
q

 
 1
1
 
and in the case of AB since 
1   AHAHB AAA
L
A
L
B
c
c
cq
q

 

1
.8 
                                                 
8 As  HB  and  AHA   ,   AHAHBAA cc   , and hence    1  AHAHB AA c
c


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As a result, a policy shift from coinsurance to reference pricing would smooth the trade-
off between risk spreading and possible perverse incentives provided. It would both 
provide more insurance and correct for moral hazard.  
 
A more founded approach to comparing risk is to use the Rothschild and Stiglitz’s classic 
(1970) characterization of “increasing risk”. They showed that, of two random variables 
with the same mean, the one with more weight in the tails is more risky. They say: 
 
If X and Y  have density functions f  and g , and if g  was obtained from f  by taking 
some of the probability weight from the centre of f  and adding it to each tail of f , in 
such a way as to leave the mean unchanged, then it seems reasonable to say that Y  is 
more uncertain than X . (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970) 
 
In the model here, income equivalent when healthy or sick under each reimbursement 
policy can be represented by a discrete variable, CIF under coinsurance and RPF under 
reference pricing, each taking three values with certain probabilities (Table D2 in 
Appendix D).   Since means of these two discrete variables differ, we cannot directly 
apply the Rothschild and Stiglitz definition. In order to use it, we first introduce a 
sequence of mean preserving spreads, G~  and G
~~ . Expected income equivalence is higher 
under reference pricing than under coinsurance (see Appendix D) by  
 
 HAHB
CI
CI
r
rq   1   
 
A discrete variable G~ is constructed by taking  amount of money from everybody and 
giving it away such that the mean of  G~  is the same as the mean of CIF . Since the same 
amount of money is taken from everyone, RPF  and G
~  don’t differ in terms of risk.9 
Using the sequence of mean preserving spreads, it is shown in Appendix D that G~ and 
                                                 
9 More specifically, they cannot be compared in terms of risk, and they have the same risk.  
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CIF have the same mean, but G
~ has less weight in the tails, and is thus less risky. By 
transitivity, RPF is less risky than CIF , meaning that more insurance is provided under 
reference pricing.   
 
Conclusion  
 
This paper has examined how the introduction of healthcare reimbursement policy of 
reference pricing for pharmaceuticals might affect the level of medical insurance. By 
covering part of the cost, insurance enables individuals to buy and consume drugs 
prescribed by their doctors, while reducing variations in real income between sick and 
healthy people. The drawback is moral hazard. With insurance, people become less price-
sensitive and may choose more expensive drugs over cheaper but therapeutically 
equivalent alternatives. For example, people may continue to buy brand name or locally 
sourced drugs over generics or parallel imports. As a result, pharmaceutical companies 
have little reason to compete in prices, leading to higher costs for society. Reference 
pricing means that the insurance only covers part of the cost of the cheapest alternative 
among a set of drugs considered therapeutically equivalent. If one buys a more expensive 
alternative, one has to pay the full extra cost.  
 
Reference pricing has previously been shown to reduce moral hazard arising from 
medical insurance. Introducing reference pricing, consumer price-sensitivity increases, 
competition increases, and the prices of drugs fall. The main contribution of the current 
paper is to point out, and to demonstrate, that reference pricing also eases the trade-off 
between proper incentives and the demand for insurance. With reference pricing, the 
optimal amount of medical insurance will be higher.  
 
The results of this normative analysis might add a new insight to the ongoing debate 
about healthcare reform in the US, aimed at controlling costs and increasing health 
insurance. The reform proposes subsidies and regulation to provide more insurance, and 
possibly a “medicare” style public health insurance plan to create competition in the 
insurance market and thereby decrease cost. Although they seem like opposing 
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alternatives, Paul Krugman stated in his New York Times column on July 24, 2009 
“when it comes to reforming health care, compassion and cost-effectiveness go hand in 
hand.” If U.S. health insurance plans were restructured to be compatible with reference 
pricing, they would have a stake in achieving the two goals, controlling healthcare costs 
and increasing health insurance at the same time.   
 
Nevertheless, the results here should be interpreted with some caution, due to limitations 
of the model, which does not account for the effect of income on demand for 
pharmaceuticals. It also does not allow for individuals who cannot afford any drug. And 
the results hold when individuals are extremely risk averse.   
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Appendix A. The Optimal Rate of Cost Sharing under Coinsurance 
 
The social welfare function 
           LjjHjj ppyppyqpyqW   1expexp1   
where  BAj ,  
 
can be rewritten as 
 
        rUVrUVrUVW LLHH    
 
where 
        ;;;;1;;1 jLjLjHjHLH ppyrUppyrUpyrUqqq  
 
and     .exp. V  
 
so that                 0
 rUrUVrUrUVrUrUV
r
W
LLLHHH   
 
Dividing both sides of the equation by         rUVrUVrUV LH 
1 and solving it 
for r  yields the optimal r as a weighted average  
 
LLHH rrrr  *  
 
There is no closed form solution of this welfare maximization problem. However, under 
the assumption that individuals are extremely risk averse   , a closed form 
solution can be obtained. The social planner would then assign all weight to the least-
healthy individuals, or in the model, to the L-types. This means that, to determine the 
optimal r , in the equation above, 0 H and 1L . 
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Let’s calculate optimal r  for both cases BB (both types consuming the locally sourced 
drug) and AB (L-types consuming parallel imported drug and H-types locally sourced 
drug) under the assumption that  . 
 
The Case of BB 
 
When both types consume the locally-sourced drug, social welfare would be 
           LBBHBB ppyppyqpyqW   1expexp1  
 
The optimal r  which maximizes social welfare, must then satisfy 
 
             0111111 22    LHAAALALBAALALB ccr rqcrrqqcr rqcrrqqrW 
 
Assuming that 0 H and 1L , then optimal r is 
0
1
*  A
L
A
L
B
cq
qr   
If the condition A
L
A
L
B cq
q 1  holds, then the optimal coinsurance rate is 10 *  r   
 
The Case of AB 
 
When L-types instead consume the parallel imports, social welfare would be 
           LAAHBB ppyppyqpyqW   1expexp1  
 
As above, the optimal r , which maximizes social welfare, must satisfy 
 
               0111111 22    LHAAAHAHBAAHAHB ccr rqcrrqqcr rqcrrqqrW 
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Assuming that 0 H and 1L , then optimal r is  
0
1
*  A
H
A
H
B
cq
qr   
If the condition A
H
A
H
B cq
q 11  holds, then the optimal coinsurance rate is 1
* r . 
 
Appendix B. The Optimal Rate of Cost Sharing under Reference Pricing 
 
The Case of BB 
 
When both types consume the locally-sourced drug, social welfare would be 
             LBBHBB ppyppyqpyqW   exp1expexp1
 
 
where   Acrqp  1 ;   ALALBABAB crcccrp    and ALALBB cc   . 
 
At the socially optimal r , the welfare function is maximized, so that  
 
        0exp1exp1 
 BrcAcrqcqq
r
W
AAA   
where     yA exp ;and
           LBHBLALB yyB   exp1expexp  
Solving the F.O.C. for r results in 
 
              
A
L
B
H
B
L
A
L
B
c
yyyr 
 exp1expln1  
 
AA
L
A
L
B
c
C
c
yr 
 ln  
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where          LBHB yyC   exp1exp  
 
It is ambiguous here whether r is larger or smaller than 0 in the optimum.  
If one defines a function F of  and   such that 
   
Ac
CF 
 ,ln,   
then  










1
0
,



if
c
y
if
c
y
F
A
H
B
A
L
B
 
Given that F is an increasing function of  , since 0F , then for 10   
 
A
B
c
yF  ,   where  HBLBB  , .  
Then, 
 
A
B
A c
y
c
C 





,lnlim  
Since, LBB
H
B    
  0lim 
 A
B
A
L
A
L
B
RP c
y
c
yr 

 
 
Then optimal *r , again, under the assumption that  , is 
 
A
B
L
A
L
B
RP c
r  *  
The Case of AB 
 
When L-types instead consume the parallel imports, social welfare would be 
             LAAHBB ppyppyqpyqW   exp1expexp1
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where   Acrqp  1 ;   AHAHBABAB crcccrp    and AHAHBB cc   ; AA crp   
 
At the socially optimal r , the welfare function is maximized so that  
 
         0exp1exp1 
 CcrAcrqcqq
r
W
AAA   
where     yA exp ; and        LAHA yyC   exp1exp    
Solving the F.O.C. for r results in 
 
 
AA
RP c
C
c
yr 
 ln*   
 
Again, it is ambiguous whether r is larger or smaller than 0 in the optimum.  
If one defines a function G of  and   such that 
   
Ac
CG 
 ,ln,   
then  










1
0
,



if
c
y
if
c
y
G
A
H
A
A
L
A
 
Given that G is an increasing function of  since 0G , for 10   
 
A
A
c
yG  ,   where  HALAA  ,  
Then, 
 
A
A
A c
y
c
C 





,lnlim  
Since LAA
H
A    
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0lim  A
A
A
RP c
y
c
yr 

 
 
Then optimal *r , again under the assumption that  , is 
A
A
RP c
r  *  
 
Appendix C. Changes in Welfare from a Change to Reference Pricing 
 
 
The Case of BB  
 
In the case of BB, total cost – which is the same for both types - is 
 
   


  A
CI
L
A
L
B
CICI cr
rrq 1  under coinsurance  
and 
 
    AALALBARPARP cccrcrq  1 under reference pricing.  
 
Both types will be better off under reference pricing if  
 
       AALALBARPARPA
CI
L
A
L
B
CICI cccrcrqcr
rrq 


   11  
 
      ARPACILALB
CI
crqcrq
r
q 


  1111   
 
Since   ARP crq1  is negative, the inequality will hold if 
A
L
A
L
B
A
c
cq   , so that 
10  CIr  
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The Case of AB  
 
In the case of AB, the total cost which H-types face is 
 
    


 


  A
CI
H
A
H
B
CIA
H
A
H
B
CI
CI cr
rc
r
rq  11 under coinsurance 
and 
    AAHAHBARPARP cccrcrq  1    under reference pricing 
 
H-types will be better of under reference pricing if 
        AAHAHBARPARPA
CI
H
A
H
B
CIA
H
A
H
B
CI
CI cccrcrqcr
rc
r
rq 


 


   111
 
      ARPACIHAHB
CI
crqcrq
r
q 


  1111   
 
Since   ARP crq1  is negative, the inequality will hold if   ALALB A c
cq   , so that 
10  CIr  
 
On the other hand, total cost which L-types face is 
 
    ACIAHAHB
CI
CI crcr
rq 


   11  under coinsurance  
and   ARPARP crcrq 1   under reference pricing 
 
L-types will be better of under reference pricing if  
 
      ARPARPACIAHAHB
CI
CI crcrqcrcr
rq 


  111   
 
      ARPACIHAHB
CI
crqcrq
r
q 


  1111   
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Again, since   ARP crq1  is negative, the inequality will hold if   ALALB A c
cq    such 
that 10  CIr . 
 
On the other hand, the change in the welfare of healthy individuals depends on the 
premiums they pay under the two policies. In the case of BB, they pay 
 
  


  A
CI
L
A
L
B
CI cr
rq 1    under coinsurance 
and 
   ARP crq 1    under reference pricing 
 
Healthy people will be better off under reference pricing if  they pay less premium than 
under coinsurance, that is, if 
    ARPA
CI
L
A
L
B
CI crqcr
rq 


  11   
 
Under the assumption that 0* RPr , this inequality implies that 
 
  41
1  A
L
A
L
B
cqq
  
 
If the probability of getting sick is low, then individuals would pay a lower premium 
under reference pricing than under coinsurance. 
 
In the case of AB, individuals instead pay 
  


  A
CI
H
A
H
B
CI cr
rq 1    under coinsurance 
and 
   ARP crq 1    under reference pricing 
 
Healthy people will be better off under reference pricing if  they pay less premium than 
under coinsurance, that is, if 
 
    ARPA
CI
H
A
H
B
CI crqcr
rq 


  11   
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Under the assumption that 0* RPr , this inequality implies that 
 
  41
1  A
L
A
L
B
cqq

 
 
If the probability of getting sick is low, then individuals would again pay a lower 
premium under reference pricing than under coinsurance. 
 
Appendix D. Comparison of Risk Based on Rothschild and Stiglitz’s Definition of  
          “Increasing Risk”  
 
 
Table D1. The income equivalent for H- and L-types when sick or healthy under    
                  coinsurance or reference pricing  
 
 Probability Income Equivalent 
  Coinsurance Reference Pricing 
Healthy 
(both types) 
q1   CIpy   RPpy  
H-types  
Sick 
q  HAACICI crpy   HAARPRP crpy   
L-types  
Sick 
 1q  LAACICI crpy   LAARPRP crpy   
 
Expected income under coinsurance is 
 
       
  
    




  HAHB
CI
CI
ttotalected
A
H
A
H
B
stockhealthected
L
A
H
BCI r
rqcqqqqqEy  111
cosexpexp
 
and under reference pricing  
           
ttotalected
A
H
A
H
B
stockhealthected
L
A
H
BRP cqqqqqEy
cosexpexp
11    
 
RPEy is thus larger than CIEy  by the amount  . 
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If we denote income equivalent under reference pricing by RPF , that under coinsurance 
by CIF . Let denote the other two discrete variables by G
~  and G
~~ where G~ is constructed 
by taking  from every single individual so that the mean of G~ is the same as that of CIF , 
and G
~~ is introduced for technical reasons as CIF , RPF  and G
~  attribute the same weight to 
all but six points. However, by definition “if two discrete random variables attribute the 
same weight to all but four points and if their differences satisfy some conditions we shall 
say that Y differs from X by a single mean preserving spread”. 
 
Table 2 - Discrete Distributions, income equivalent and probability 
 
 Healthy Sick 
  H-type L-type 
RPF  

oI  
q1  

HI  
q  

LI  
 1q  
G~  
oI  
q1  
HI  
q  
LI  
 1q  
G
~~  
oI   oI  
      q1  
HI  
q  
LI  
 1q  
CIF  oI  
q1  
HI  
q  
LI  
 1q  
 
* Expressions in the upper part of each cell of Table 2 represent income equivalent of utility in different 
states of being for different types, and terms in the lower part denote probability.  
 
In Table D2 iI where LHoi ,,  represents income equivalent of utility in different states 
of being, health and sick, for different types, H-types and L-types, explicit forms of 
which are given in Table D1.  
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Given that 0RPr , it is straight forward that  
(i)  LHo III  
 
(ii) LHo III   
 
(iii) LLLHHHooo IIIIIIIII   
 
First we compare the distribution CIF  and  G
~~ . They attribute the same weight to all but 
four points that corresponds to LI , LI , oI  and oI . If we denote the difference in 
weight, the two distributions attached to each point by 321 ,, xxx and 4x respectively such 
that 
    LLCI IGIFx
~~PrPr1  


 

  LLCI IGIFx
~~PrPr2  


 

  ooCI IGIFx
~~PrPr3  
    ooCI IGIFx
~~PrPr4  
Since , following Rotschild and Stiglitz (1970) 
(i)   11 qx ,   12 qx  such that 021  xx  
(ii)   qx 13 ,  qx 14  such that 034  xx  
CIF has more weight in the tail than  G
~~ does meaning that CIF is riskier than G
~~ .  
Then we compare the two distributions G
~~ and G~ . They attribute the same weight to all 
but four points that corresponds to HI , HI , oI  and oI . If we denote the 
difference in weight, the two distributions attached to each point, by 321 ,, yyy and 
4y respectively such that 
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 HH IGIGy   ~Pr~~Pr1  


 

  HH IGIGy ~Pr
~~Pr2  


 

  oo IGIGy ~Pr
~~Pr3  
 oo IGIGy   ~Pr~~Pr4  
Since , following Rotschild and Stiglitz (1970) 
(i) qy 1 , qx 2  such that 021  xx  
(ii)  3y , 4x  such that 034  xx  
G
~~ has more weight in the tails than  G~ does meaning that G
~~ is riskier than G~ . By 
transitivity, since CIF is riskier than G
~~ which is in turn riskier than G~ , then CIF is riskier 
than G~ . 
 
